China and the Middle East

In the postwar era, Mao’s China was predominantly a peasant economy sheltered from international influence. For generations, the country was effectively isolated from world affairs, struggling to feed its own population and maintain stability at home. But now, as an emerging global player, it is increasingly venturing into the murky world of international relations.

For 70 years, China has claimed adherence to the doctrine of ‘non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries’. It is still a guiding principle, but like many of China’s political pronouncements, you can take it literally – or with a pinch of salt. In 2019, the term ‘wolf warrior’ became widely used to describe a new assertive, militaristic brand of Chinese diplomacy, soon after setting up its first permanent overseas military base in Djibouti. A few years later, it dialled down its aggressive rhetoric, presenting itself as a ‘credible, loveable and respectable China’.

Regardless of appearances, China’s pragmatic foreign engagement continues apace. As America gets bogged down in the Strait of Hormuz, China influence in the Middle East has widened, pouring billions of renminbi into ports, petrochemicals and renewables via the Belt and Road. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt have leveraged Chinese financing and technology in solar farms, armaments, digital infrastructure and more. In 2023, Beijing briefly mediated a Saudi-Iran deal, and a year later made headlines with its ‘Beijing Declaration’, negotiating with Hamas for a ceasefire and a two-state solution to Palestine/Israeli relations.

Recently, Al-Jazeera wrote that ‘China has no selfish interests in the Palestinian question’. So, is China purely interested in peace and stability in the region or is it motivated by its potential challenge to Western hegemony? Does China’s model of no-strings capital investment to anyone that will support it help stabilise the Middle East, or merely empower the region’s most destabilising regimes? Indeed, is China politically shrewd or dangerously naïve? If the West continues to underinvest in economic statecraft, will it wake up to find Beijing the leading external power in the region by default?